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(117) 
DEBATE 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STOP-AND-FRISK  
IN NEW YORK CITY 
Stop-and-frisk, a crime prevention tactic that allows a police officer to 
stop a person based on “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity and frisk 
based on reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous, has 
been a contentious police practice since first approved by the Supreme 
Court in 1968. In Floyd v. City of New York, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York ruled that New York City’s stop-and-frisk 
practices violate both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Professors 
David Rudovsky and Lawrence Rosenthal debate the constitutionality of 
stop-and-frisk in New York City in light of Floyd and Judge Shira A. 
Scheindlin’s controversial removal from the case. Professor Rudovsky 
argues that Floyd shows the important role of data and statistical analysis in 
assessing the constitutionality of stop-and-frisk procedures. He contends 
that empirical evidence regarding both the factors for and outcomes of stops 
and frisks in New York demonstrates that either the legal standard is too 
permissive or police-stop documentation is not truthful. In response, 
Professor Rosenthal argues that Judge Scheindlin erred in failing to 
consider evidence of stop-and-frisk’s efficacy—evidence indicating that the 
NYPD’s stops are based on reasonable suspicion, a standard considerably 
less demanding than “preponderance of the evidence.” Additionally, 
Rosenthal argues that Judge Scheindlin should have considered differential 
offending by race or other potentially nondiscriminatory explanations for 
the higher stop rates of minorities. 
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OPENING STATEMENT 
Stop-and-Frisk: The Power of Data and the Decision in 
Floyd v. City of New York 
 
 
DAVID RUDOVSKY† 
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court ruled that a person could be seized 
by the police based on a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was involved 
in serious criminal conduct, and further, if there were also reasonable 
suspicion that the person stopped was “armed and dangerous,” the officer 
could frisk the suspect for the officer’s protection. See 392 U.S. 1, 27, 30 
(1968). Over the past forty-five years, the power of police to stop and frisk 
has greatly expanded and now encompasses all suspected criminal activity, 
no matter how trivial, and under circumstances where the conduct observed 
may be fully consistent with innocence. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 
534 U.S. 266, 274-75 (2002). Given the extremely broad grounds for stop-
and-frisk, the large numbers of persons subjected to these stops, the wide 
discretion of police departments to decide where to deploy officers and 
whom to stop and frisk, and the disproportionate number of minorities 
subjected to these investigative detentions, it is no surprise that the Terry 
doctrine continues to be highly controversial as a question of constitutional 
law and as an aspect of the broader issue of effective and fair policing.  
In Floyd v. City of New York, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin ruled that New 
York City’s stop-and-frisk practices violate the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209, at *70-75 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013). The court reached these conclusions on a full 
evidentiary record that included a statistical analysis of over 4.4 million 
stops in New York City from January 2004 to June 2012. Id. at *1. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stayed the judgment and remedial 
order and, in a controversial ruling, removed Judge Scheindlin from the case 
on grounds that her acceptance of the case as “related” to a previous case over 
which she presided, as well as her interviews with the press, created an 
appearance of impropriety. In re Reassignment of Cases: Floyd v. City of 
 
† David Rudovsky is a Senior Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and a 
founding partner of Kairys, Rudovsky, Messing & Feinberg LLP. Professor Rudovsky served as 
counsel in Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, C.A. No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011), discussed infra. 
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New York, No. 13-3088, 2013 WL 5998139, at *1-8 (2d Cir. Nov. 13, 2013). In 
this Opening Statement, I contend that Judge Scheindlin’s factual findings 
and legal analysis are correct. I start with a brief overview of the Terry 
doctrine, follow with a discussion of Floyd and related litigation in Philadelphia, 
and then provide a critique of both the doctrinal and policing aspects of 
investigative detentions. 
The Supreme Court’s definition of the Terry “reasonable suspicion” 
standard has been largely a function of the Justices’ subjective assessments 
as to whether the conduct at issue is predictive of criminal conduct. The 
Court has repeatedly stated that it would apply “commonsense” judgments 
and permit officers to make reasonable inferences from a suspect’s behavior 
in determining whether there were legal grounds for a stop-and-frisk. See, 
e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). The Court has not 
required police or prosecutors to demonstrate by empirical data that the 
characteristics relied upon—for example, that the suspect was acting 
suspiciously, had fled from police, had bulges in his pockets, or was engaged 
in “furtive movements”—are actually predictive of criminal conduct. Thus, 
in Wardlow, the Court permitted a stop-and-frisk where the suspect fled 
from police in a high crime area. Id. at 124-25. There was no other proof of 
any criminal conduct and the Court recognized that many persons, particu-
larly in minority neighborhoods, might not want to engage with the police 
and might flee, though perfectly innocent. Id. at 125. The Court simply 
assumed that persons who avoided the police in high crime areas could 
reasonably be suspected to be involved in criminal conduct. But studies 
have shown that there is no significant correlation between this conduct and 
criminal activity. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, 
Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 790 (2000).  
As a related matter, the Supreme Court’s definition of “reasonable sus-
picion” permits consideration of behavior that is entirely innocent. See 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274-75. Indeed, stops and frisks have often been justified 
on vague and subjective grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Erwin, 803 F.2d 
1505, 1510 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that police possessed reasonable suspicion 
where an arriving airline passenger scanned the passenger area, walked at a 
fast pace through the terminal, clutched his carry-on luggage, became 
nervous when police advised him they were investigating drug trafficking, and 
provided inconsistent statements about needing to visit his sick grandmother).  
In addition, the lack of empirical data (a direct result of the failure of 
most police departments to maintain stop-and-frisk data) has compromised 
the constitutional assessment of stop-and-frisk practices. We do not know 
what grounds for stops tend to reveal criminal conduct, including possession 
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of weapons. Nor do we have data from most police departments regarding 
racial disparities in stops or even the actual number of stops and frisks. As a 
result, the legal doctrine, police procedures, and community responses to 
this pervasive practice have been based on conjecture and speculation. 
Further, case-by-case adjudications are made in a vacuum as courts do not 
have access to relevant information regarding the universe of stops and 
frisks in each jurisdiction.  
Finally, the stop-and-frisk doctrine has developed primarily as a func-
tion of the exclusionary rule, which means that the cases in which courts 
adjudicate the issue are those where contraband or other evidence of 
criminal conduct was uncovered in the investigative detention. In this 
context, significant forces, including police perjury and judicial reluctance to 
suppress evidence, can distort the fact-finding process and legal analysis.  
In New York City, stop-and-frisk practices have generated strong debate 
on the wisdom and legality of these procedures. This debate came to a head 
in Floyd v. City of New York. From January 2004 through June 2012, the New 
York City Police Department made 4.4 million pedestrian stops, of which 
over 80% were of African Americans or Latinos. Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at 
*1. More than half of those stopped were also subjected to a frisk. The Floyd 
court found the following facts:  
• The number of stops per year rose sharply from 314,000 in 2004 to a 
high of 686,000 in 2011. Id. at *3. The 2011 figure represents approxi-
mately 8.3% of New York City’s 2011 population, estimated at 8.24 mil-
lion persons. See POPULATION DIV., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY DEMOGRAPHIC AND HOUSING ES-
TIMATES: NEW YORK CITY AND BOROUGHS (Sept. 2012), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/census/boro_demo_2011_acs.pdf. 
• 52% of all stops were followed by a protective frisk for weapons; a 
weapon was found in only 1.5% of these frisks. Floyd, 2013 WL 
4046209, at *3. 
• 8% of all stops led to a search into the stopped person’s clothing—
ostensibly because the officer felt an object during the frisk that he 
either suspected to be a weapon or immediately perceived to be other 
contraband. In 9% of these searches, the object was a weapon. 91% of 
the time, it was not. In 86% of these searches, the object was not con-
traband. Id. at *4. 
• 6% of all 4.4 million stops resulted in an arrest; 6% resulted in a sum-
mons. The remaining 88% resulted in no further law enforcement ac-
tion. Id. 
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• In 83% of the 4.4 million stops, the person stopped was black or His-
panic; in 10%, the person was white. Id. 
• In 2010, New York City’s resident population was 23% black, 29% His-
panic, and 33% white. Id. 
• The officer used force in 23% of the stops of blacks, in 24% of the stops 
of Hispanics, and in 17% of the stops of whites. Id.  
• Weapons were seized in 1.0% of the stops of blacks, in 1.1% of the stops 
of Hispanics, and in 1.4% of the stops of whites. Id. 
• Contraband other than weapons was seized in 1.8% of the stops of 
blacks, in 1.7% of the stops of Hispanics, and in 2.3% of the stops of 
whites. Id. 
• In 2004, the officer failed to state a specific suspected crime in 1% of 
stops. This figure rose to ��% by 2009. Id. 
Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, conducted a review of forms pre-
pared by officers after each stop and classified the stops as “apparently 
justified,” “apparently unjustified,” or “ungeneralizable.” Id. at *17. Signifi-
cantly, this review accepted as true in every instance the information stated 
by the police. Id. These indefinite categories reflected a flawed recording 
system that consisted mainly of checkboxes of highly subjective factors 
(e.g., “furtive movements,” “evasive response,” “suspicious bulge,” “high 
crime area”), id. at *17-18, none of which provided a full textual statement of 
the basis for a stop. The repetitive use of “high crime area” and “furtive 
movements” as the basis for the stop led Dr. Fagan to conclude that officers 
were employing a routinized script in asserting reasonable suspicion. Id. In 
addition to the vague and patterned reasons for stops, the court noted that 
some stops were not recorded, that 36% of the 2009 stop forms did not 
identify a suspected crime, that “furtive movements” and “high crime area” 
(which were each marked in over 40% of the stops) were “negatively 
correlated” with a summons or arrest, and that only 12% of all stops resulted 
in an arrest or summons. Id. at *13, *19. On this basis, the court concluded 
that the number of stops without reasonable suspicion was significantly 
greater than the 200,000 impermissible stops identified by plaintiffs, id. at 
*18-19, and that the City had a policy and custom of Fourth Amendment 
violations. Id. at *70. 
On the race discrimination claim, the court first had to decide which of 
the competing “benchmarks” proposed by the experts provided the best 
statistical approach for measuring possible racial profiling. Id. at *19. Dr. 
Fagan used population and reported crime as benchmarks for understanding 
4-Part Debate Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)12/10/2013 9:30 AM 
122 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 162: 117 
the racial distribution of stops. Id. at *20. The City proposed a benchmark 
consisting of the rates at which various races appear in suspect descriptions 
from crime victims (“suspect race description data”). Id. 
The court credited Dr. Fagan’s analysis and ruled that the City’s 
benchmark was flawed by the assumption that the racial distribution of 
stopped pedestrians would resemble the racial distribution of the local 
criminal population, even if “the people stopped [we]re not criminals.” Id. 
(emphasis omitted). Given the fact that nearly 90% of all persons stopped 
were not involved in criminal conduct and that only 13% were stopped 
pursuant to a specific suspect description, a benchmark of persons actually 
involved in criminal conduct was not reliable. Id. Crime suspect data may 
serve as a reliable proxy for the pool of criminals exhibiting suspicious 
behavior, but not for innocent persons, particularly where the “behavior” 
descriptions are so vague and often consistent with innocence. It is important 
to note that even where there are high levels of crime by race, very few 
persons in the community are responsible. By the City’s logic, all minority 
residents are properly suspect for the acts of these very few assailants. Cf. 
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (“Just as a man with a hammer sees every problem 
as a nail, so a man with a badge may see every corner of his beat as a high 
crime area.”). 
Dr. Fagan’s standards and regression analysis provided strong support 
for a finding of race discrimination. More stops were made of blacks and 
Hispanics, even when other relevant variables were held constant. Floyd, 
2013 WL 4046209, at *23-24. Dr. Fagan cited the excess of race-correlated 
stops beyond that which would be consistent with the local crime rate as 
evidence of racially disparate treatment. Id. at *24. The analysis also 
revealed that, regardless of the racial composition of a geographic area, 
blacks and Hispanics were more likely to be stopped. Id. Once stopped, 
blacks were 30% more likely than whites to be arrested (controlling for the 
alleged crime), as opposed to receiving a summons. Id. And minorities were 
9-14% more likely to be subjected to the use of force. Id. Most significantly, 
the hit rate for blacks, as measured by the issuance of a summons or an arrest, 
was 8% lower than for white suspects. Id. This evidence demonstrates that 
minorities were targeted for stops based on a lesser degree of suspicion. 
Beyond the statistical evidence, the court found evidence of race dis-
crimination through an examination of “institutional” practices, specifically 
the deliberate indifference of the NYPD to patterns of race discrimination 
in stop-and-frisk practices. Id. at *24-47, *74-75. These patterns were 
recognized as early as 1999, when the New York Attorney General issued a 
report on stop-and-frisk practices that documented unexplained racial 
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disparities in stops. Id. at *25 & n.200. Despite this knowledge, the NYPD 
put great pressure on commanders and others in the chain of command 
(down to patrol officers) to increase the number of stops (from ��,��� in 
2002 to 686,000 in 2011), id. at *26-33, but failed to audit the stops for 
possible racial discrimination. Id. at *38-39. And there was evidence that 
officers were encouraged to make stops based on racial characteristics or 
stereotypes—to target the “right people,” young blacks and Hispanics. Id. at 
*72. The court determined that these factors were evidence of the NYPD’s 
failure to adequately train, supervise, or discipline officers with respect to 
racial profiling practices. Id. at *75. 
The constitutional flaws in the New York City program are not isolated 
phenomena. In Philadelphia, from 2008 to 2009, stops increased by almost 
20%, reaching an annual rate of over 253,000 for a population less than 1.6 
million, thus exceeding the rate of pedestrian stops in New York City. See 
Research & Planning Unit, Phila. Police Dep’t, Investigation of Person by 
District ( June 7, 2011) (on file with author) (noting a total of 216,832 stops 
in 2008 and 253,276 stops in 2009); see also PHILA. RESEARCH INITIA-
TIVE, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PHILADELPHIA: THE STATE OF 
THE CITY, A 2010 UPDATE 5 fig. (2010) (estimating the 2009 Philadelphia 
population at 1.55 million), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/ 
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Philadelphia_Research_Initiative/ 
PEW_SOCupdate_FIN.pdf#page=5#page. In 2010, a class action lawsuit 
was filed against the City of Philadelphia, presenting the same Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment claims raised in Floyd. See Settlement Agreement, 
Class Certification, and Consent Decree at �, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, 
C.A. No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011), available at http://web.law. 
columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/contract-economic-organization/ 
files/baileyagreement.pdf. Soon thereafter, the parties agreed to a consent 
decree that required the City to conduct stops and frisks within constitu-
tional limits; prohibited stops and frisks solely on the basis of “loitering,” 
being in a “high crime . . . area,” “acting suspiciously,” or making “furtive 
movements;” and prohibited the use of race as a basis for a stop except in cases 
of suspect identifications by race. Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Between 2009 and 2012, the number of stops in Philadelphia dropped 
from 253,000 to 215,000 per year. See Plaintiffs’ Third Report to Court and 
Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 4, Bailey, C.A. No. 10-5952, availa-
ble at http://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/����/���. However, 
the high rate of impermissible stops and frisks has persisted. A 2012 audit of 
a random sample of 1850 stops revealed that 43-47% of all stops and frisks 
were made without reasonable suspicion. Id. (A police department audit of 
2013 stops showed a patrol unit rate of 37% improper stops. Audits & 
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Inspections Div., Phila. Police Dep’t, 75-48A Comprehensive Audit: 2nd 
Quarter 2013, at � (Sept. �, ����) (on file with author).) The hit rates in 
2012 were even lower than in New York City. Contraband was recovered in 
only twenty-nine stops (1.57% of all stops) and only three guns were seized 
(0.16%). Id. at 9. Arrests occurred in only 5.29% of all stops. Id. at 10. 
Floyd and Bailey show the important role of data and statistical analysis 
in assessing Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment stop-and-frisk issues. With 
respect to Fourth Amendment analysis, police forms provide comprehen-
sive information from which one can determine on a systemic basis whether 
stops are being conducted with the requisite reasonable suspicion. As we 
can see from the New York and Philadelphia data, large numbers of these 
stops facially violate Fourth Amendment standards.  
With respect to frisks, the data are even more troubling. In New York 
City, between 2004 and 2012, there was a 1.5% rate of recovery of a weapon 
following a frisk, Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *3, while in Philadelphia the 
rate was 1.1% after the consent decree went into effect. Plaintiffs’ Third 
Report to Court, supra, at 6-7. It must be remembered that frisks may only 
be conducted where the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person 
stopped is armed and dangerous. And while the courts have not quantified 
the reasonable suspicion standard in terms of expected hit rates for contra-
band, these rates are well below any reasonable threshold. In other words, if 
the police are truthfully reporting the basis for their stops, it is apparent 
that the legal standard is entirely too permissive as it authorizes stops and 
frisks on the basis of conduct that is not reliably predictive of criminality. 
The courts’ rulings that actions such as being present in a high crime area, 
engaging in furtive movements, avoiding police contact, or appearing 
nervous when stopped reliably predict criminal conduct (or that a suspicious 
bulge or evasive conduct points to possession of a weapon) are largely 
unsupported by the data. Alternatively, to the degree that these factors are 
in fact predictive of criminal conduct, the low hit rates raise serious ques-
tions about the truthfulness and accuracy of police-stop documentation.  
The stop-and-frisk data also provide a reliable basis on which to deter-
mine whether racial disparities in stop-and-frisk practices are the result of 
racial profiling. Claims of racial bias are virtually impossible to prove in a 
motion to suppress—in fact, the Supreme Court has ruled that racially 
discriminatory stops are not even the proper subject of Fourth Amendment 
analysis, see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)—or even in a 
civil rights lawsuit for damages. As the Floyd opinion reflects, benchmarks 
and sophisticated regression analysis can properly measure discriminatory 
patterns. For example, statistical findings that whites subjected to a stop-
and-frisk are more likely to be carrying a weapon than blacks or Hispanics 
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are probative of the fact that the threshold for stopping minorities is lower 
than that for stopping whites. Indeed, there is a certain irony in the Police 
Department’s criticism of the statistical evidence in Floyd, which was relied 
upon by the court only after a rigorous Daubert challenge. See Floyd v. City 
of New York, ��� F. Supp. �d ��� (S.D.N.Y. ����) (admitting plaintiffs’ 
expert’s opinions). For many years, police and prosecutors in New York and 
elsewhere have relied on police “experts” to convict defendants based on 
untested scientific theories (e.g., hair samples, shoeprints, bite marks, and 
outdated arson analysis) that have been proven to be unreliable. See NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 145-150, 155-61, 170-
76 (2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf.  
A word on efficacy. Judge Scheindlin precluded the City from present-
ing evidence to support its position that stop-and-frisk has played a signifi-
cant role in reducing crime in New York City. See Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, 
at *1. The proposition that the stop-and-frisk practices in New York have 
been successful in reducing crime is both factually questionable and ulti-
mately legally irrelevant. The court made clear that the resolution of the 
case was not an all-or-nothing proposition. The NYPD can continue to stop 
and frisk in accordance with constitutional principles. Thus, the issue is not 
whether stops and frisks generally reduce crime, but whether the unlawful 
stops and frisks can be justified on the basis of crime control. And, on this 
question, not only does the evidence show very low hit rates, but it also fails 
to show any causative effects. Accordingly, in the first quarter of ����, there 
was a 50% reduction in the number of stops in New York City (compared 
with the first quarter of ����), but violent crime rates have continued to 
drop at rates similar to those of past years, when the stop rate was far 
higher. See, e.g., Tamer El-Ghobashy & Michael Howard Saul, New York 
Police Use of Stop-and-Frisk Drops, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873233725045784673615
07997492. Of course, this evidence does not prove that stops play no role in 
crime control; rather, it demonstrates that the causal effects of various 
means of policing and related social and economic factors on crime reduc-
tion are not easily determined. 
Equally important, as a legal matter, the fact that unrestrained police 
practices (e.g., dispensing with the probable cause and warrant require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment) would suppress crime does not mean that 
in our constitutional system, such “efficacy” can trump restrictions on 
governmental police powers. Is the City contending that unconstitutional 
stops are legitimate on the basis of the deterrent effect they have on residents 
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who, knowing that they may be stopped without reason or because of their 
race, decide not to carry weapons or contraband on the streets? 
Finally, those who criticize the Floyd ruling must come to terms with the 
long-term failure of the NYPD to engage in self-regulation and internal 
accountability with respect to its stop-and-frisk practices. For years, data 
that showed that officers had been engaging in large numbers of stops that 
violated the Fourth Amendment were ignored, and the “scripted” forms 
supposedly supporting these stops were taken at face value. Claims of racial 
bias and gratuitous insults and demeaning conduct during stops were also 
brushed aside, under the mantra that such practices were necessary to 
effective policing and reduction of crime. Indeed, the expert reports and 
other evidence in Floyd provided no information not already known to the 
NYPD. Courts are hesitant to intervene in policing on a systemic level, but 
in this case, the deliberate indifference by the NYPD made judicial inter-
vention necessary and proper. 
Floyd reached the right result for the right reasons. Stops without legal 
justification are unconstitutional and have a counterproductive effect by 
reducing the trust necessary for community policing. And worse, if such 
violations are also racially disproportionate, the injuries cut even deeper. 
Pro-active, “hot spot,” and community policing can continue to play a role 
in ensuring public safety. Nothing in Floyd prevents the police from stop-
ping persons based on adequate factual grounds, as long as the practice is 
not tainted by racial bias. Indeed, reform of these practices can establish the 
foundation for fairer and more effective community-based policing. These 
reforms are possible through court-ordered remedies, but only if police 
departments accept the basic constitutional tenets and hold officers and 
supervisors accountable for systemic transgressions. 
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REBUTTAL 
One-Eyed Floyd 
 
 
LAWRENCE ROSENTHAL‡ 
Perhaps the most curious thing about Judge Scheindlin’s decision con-
demning the New York City Police Department’s program of stop-and-frisk 
is how it insists on viewing stop-and-frisk in a relentlessly monocular fashion.  
1. There is irony in Judge Scheindlin’s finding that the NYPD’s use of 
stop-and-frisk amounts to a policy of unreasonable search and seizure in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. This tactic, branded as “unreasonable” 
by Judge Scheindlin, actually seems to work. 
Homicide in New York City rose from a rate of 4.7 per 100,000 popula-
tion in 1960 to a 1991 peak of 31.0, in waves that roughly corresponded to 
drug epidemics, with the increase concentrated in firearms-related homi-
cides. See Jeffrey Fagan, Deanna L. Wilkinson & Garth Davies, Social 
Contagion of Violence, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF VIOLENT 
BEHAVIOR AND AGGRESSION 688, 694-���, ��� fig.��.� (Daniel J. 
Flannery et al. eds., 2007). In 1991, the NYPD adopted a new community 
policing model that emphasized foot patrols and combating low-level 
disorder. See CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE 
ATTORNEY GEN., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S 
“STOP AND FRISK” PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
47-52 (1999), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/default/files/pdfs/ 
bureaus/civil_rights/stp_frsk.pdf. Three years later, after the appointment 
of a new police commissioner, the department began to place greater 
emphasis on aggressive stop-and-frisk tactics for minor infractions, adopted 
a system of statistical analysis that targeted enforcement at “hot spots” of crime, 
and imposed greater managerial accountability. See id. at 52-56 & 53 n.32.  
Between 1991 and 2009, New York experienced the broadest and deepest 
decline in violent crime of any major American city. See FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS 
FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 3-27 (2012). By 2012, New York’s 
homicide victimization rate dropped to 5.05 per 100,000 population. See 
 
‡ Professor of Law, Chapman University Fowler School of Law.  
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FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2012, at tbl.8 (2013), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.- 
2012/tables/8tabledatadecpdf/table-8-state-cuts/table_�_offenses_known_to_ 
law_enforcement_by_new_york_by_city_2012.xls (showing 419 incidents of 
murder and nonnegligent manslaughter out of a population of 8.3 million). 
Space does not permit a complete examination of the causes of New York’s 
crime drop. Elsewhere, I have reviewed the evidence and demonstrated that 
there is a substantial case to be made that New York’s stop-and-frisk tactics 
deserve considerable credit. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Original-
ism, Race, and the Case Against Terry v. Ohio, 43 TEX TECH. L. REV. 299, 
320-30 (2010). Two additional studies by eminent criminologists have 
provided additional evidence supporting this conclusion. See ZIMRING, 
supra, at 131-44; David Weisburd, Cody W. Telep & Brian A. Lawton, 
Could Innovations in Policing Have Contributed to the New York City Crime 
Drop Even in a Period of Declining Police Strength? The Case of Stop, Question 
and Frisk as a Hot Spots Policing Strategy, JUST. Q. 11-18 (Jan. 11, 2013), 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07418825.2012.754920#preview. 
The superiority of proactive policing over reactive patrol should be un-
surprising. As one criminologist put it, “Police on patrol cannot see enough 
to intervene very often in the life of the community.” Mark Harrison 
Moore, Problem-Solving and Community Policing, in 15 MODERN POLICING 
99, 112 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992). Years ago, a police 
executive made the same point to me when he told me that he had come to 
regret that air conditioning had been installed in his department’s patrol 
cars. In that insight can be found the case for stop-and-frisk. When under-
taken with frequency and targeted at hot spots of crime, stop-and-frisk can 
alter the perceptions of offenders by making apparent the risks of carrying 
drugs or guns in public. Reactive patrol, by contrast, encourages criminals 
to intimidate the community so that they do not call police for help. When 
drugs and guns are driven off the streetscape, the risks of violent confronta-
tion decrease; community decline driven by open and notorious criminality 
can be reversed. Indeed, aggressive patrol focused at statistical “hot spots” 
of crime is one of the few crime control policies that has generated fairly 
consistent evidence of its efficacy. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 
OF THE NAT’L ACADS., FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL 
REVIEW 230-35 (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 2005); Cody W. Telep & 
David Weisburd, What Is Known About the Effectiveness of Police Practices in 
Reducing Crime and Disorder?, 15 POLICE Q. 331, 333-36, 340-41 (2012). 
Like all debates about policing and crime, there are a myriad of factors 
at work, and rarely can causal statements be made with complete confi-
dence. Yet, if there is any kind of serious case to be made for stop-and-frisk’s 
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ability to drive down crime, surely the judiciary ought to pause before 
tampering with tactics that may well save lives. 
Judge Scheindlin, however, refused to cast her eye to questions of effica-
cy, believing instead that her “mandate [wa]s solely to judge the constitution-
ality of police behavior, not its effectiveness as a law enforcement tool.” 
Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013). Yet, in the seminal case blessing stop-and-frisk 
as an investigative tool, the Supreme Court concluded that “there is ‘no 
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need 
to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] 
entails.’” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)). To strike this 
balance, a court must consider the “general interest . . . of effective crime 
prevention and detection,” an “interest which underlies the recognition that 
a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate 
manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal 
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” Id. at 
22. Judge Scheindlin, however, refused to consider this interest in “effective 
crime prevention.” To be sure, none of this means that the Fourth Amend-
ment tolerates unconstrained stop-and-frisk merely because it reduces 
crime. But evidence of the efficacy of stop-and-frisk offers at least some 
indication that the NYPD’s stops are based on reasonable suspicion that 
criminal activity is afoot. 
2. There is irony as well in Judge Scheindlin’s conclusion that stop-and-
frisk amounts to discrimination against minorities, the chief beneficiary of 
stop-and-frisk. Yet, this reality also remained unseen by Judge Scheindlin. 
If the NYPD targets minorities, it is not alone; New York’s criminals do the 
same. At the peak of New York’s crime wave in 1991, the homicide victimi-
zation rate in New York was 58 per 100,000 for blacks, 44 for Hispanics, and 
8 for whites. ANDREW KARMEN, NEW YORK MURDER MYSTERY: THE 
TRUE STORY BEHIND THE CRIME CRASH OF THE 1990S �� fig.�.� 
(2000). By 2007, the black homicide victimization rate had declined by more 
than 42 per 100,000 to 15.9, and the Hispanic rate by more than 39 to 4.9, 
while the white rate declined by less than 7 per 100,000, reaching 1.55. See 
ZIMRING, supra, at �� fig.�.�. Accordingly, the decline in homicide victimi-
zation rates for blacks and Hispanics far exceeded that experienced by 
whites. Still, the racial skew in homicide victimization continues.  
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 The NYPD reported the following victimization statistics for 2012: 
 
 Murder and Non-
Negligent Homicide 
Shootings New York City 
Population 
Black 60.1% 74.1% 22.8% 
Hispanic 26.7% 22.2% 28.8% 
White 8.7% 2.8% 33.1% 
Asian/ 
Pac. Isl. 
4.2% 0.8% 12.7% 
 
RAYMOND W. KELLY, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, CRIME AND ENFORCE-
MENT ACTIVITY IN NEW YORK CITY 1, 11, B-1 (2013), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/2012
_year_end_enforcement_report.pdf. When a federal judge sets out to 
remake local policing policy while indifferent to the efficacy of those 
policies she brands unconstitutional, it is the lives of minorities that are 
placed at greatest risk. 
3. Judge Scheindlin found that Fourth Amendment violations involving 
stop-and-frisk occurred so frequently in New York that they amounted to 
both a custom with the force of law and a practice to which policymakers 
were deliberately indifferent. Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *70-72. Yet, she 
also acknowledged that about 6% of all stops resulted in an arrest and 
another 6% resulted in a summons. Id. at *4. The Fourth Amendment 
reasonable suspicion standard “falls considerably short of satisfying a 
preponderance of the evidence standard.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 
266, 274 (2002). It also “accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent 
people.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000). In this context, a 12% 
hit rate does not look so bad. It looks even better when one considers that 
even an apparently unsuccessful stop-and-frisk can create important benefits 
by deterring potential offenders and cooling off criminogenic hot spots. 
Although the Floyd plaintiffs produced evidence relating to nineteen 
specific stops, ���� WL �������, at *�, such a small sample proves very 
little about New York City’s policies. With hundreds of thousands of stops 
at issue, the facts of nineteen discrete incidents cherry-picked by the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers are statistically meaningless. More significant is the 
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analysis of the plaintiffs’ expert. Relying on data from the UF-250 forms that 
officers must complete after stops, he estimated that the rate of “apparently 
unjustified” stops was about 6%. Id. at *16-17. To my eye, this does not look 
like evidence of a police department that has effectively decreed that 
noncompliance with the law is its official policy, or that is deliberately 
indifferent to constitutional requirements. One study of police practices in a 
mid-sized American city found that 46% of pat-down searches observed by 
researchers were unconstitutional. See Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. 
Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior Under the U.S. Constitu-
tion, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 333 (2004). I have my doubts 
about the soundness of that conclusion, see Rosenthal, supra, at 330 n.210, 
but by that standard, the NYPD is doing pretty well. 
Judge Scheindlin, however, discounted the significance of the 12% hit 
rate and the estimated �% unjustified stop rate with a cascade of specula-
tion. She opined that these calculations are unreliable because officers may 
not always prepare a UF-250; UF-���s reflect only the officer’s version of a 
stop and do not contain enough information to ascertain its lawfulness; 
many of the “stop factors” listed on the UF-250 form are unreliable indica-
tors of reasonable suspicion; over time, officers learned to check off a greater 
number of factors in order to justify a search; and because the plaintiffs’ 
expert was overly conservative in his assumption that certain ambiguous 
factors justified stops. See Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *16-19. Still, it is 
striking that no expert was willing to opine that the UF-250 database could 
properly support a finding of a rate of unjustified stops exceeding �%; it was 
the nonexpert in black robes who drew that conclusion.  
Indeed, Judge Scheindlin’s discussion of the flaws in the UF-250 data, 
viewed from a different angle, suggests that there was no proper support for 
her findings. We cannot tell whether the data reflect the rate of unjustified 
stops or simply the limitations of the UF-250 form. The factors listed on 
the form may be imperfect, but they are all we have for statistical analysis; 
and they are hardly irrelevant to the lawfulness of stop-and-frisk. Although 
Judge Scheindlin deprecated presence in a “high crime area” and “furtive 
movements” as justifications for a stop, id. at *17-19, the Supreme Court has 
explained that both “nervous, evasive behavior” and “the fact that the stop 
occurred in a ‘high crime area’” are relevant to assessing the lawfulness of a 
stop. Wardlow, ��� U.S. at ��� (citations omitted). Thus, officers’ use of 
these factors does not mean that a stop is unjustified; indeed, their use of 
these factors explains why the plaintiffs’ expert was unable to characterize 
stops as unjustified when these factors were present in combination with 
others. Similarly, one can only speculate whether evolving trends in officers’ 
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use of the UF-��� form reflect misconduct or, instead, an increasing 
awareness of the need for care in documenting the justification for stops. 
This is not to say that all is well with stop-and-frisk in New York. The 
number of stops per year increased from 314,000 in 2004 to 686,000 in 2011. 
Floyd, ���� WL �������, at *�. It is hard to believe that officers’ keen 
observations alone produced such an astonishing surge. Moreover, there is 
ample evidence that supervisors pressured subordinates to increase stops. 
Id. at *26-33. It may well be that as crime continued to decline in tandem 
with increased stop-and-frisk, command staff pushed the practice to the 
point of diminishing returns. For example, stop-and-frisk may have spread 
well beyond the hot spots where it is most likely to be justified—a conclu-
sion supported by evidence of increasing stops in relatively low crime areas 
where suspects seemed merely “out of place.” See Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey 
Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s “Stop 
and Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. 
ASS’N 813, 822 (2007). If this happened, however, it argues only for retain-
ing stop-and-frisk’s original focus on high crime hot spots—certainly not for 
condemning stop-and-frisk even when it is so targeted. 
4. Judge Scheindlin also determined that the NYPD has “a policy of indi-
rect racial profiling based on local criminal suspect data” and that the 
NYPD and the City “have been deliberately indifferent to the intentionally 
discriminatory application of stop and frisk.” Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at 
*72. She based these conclusions on evidence that blacks and Hispanics 
were stopped at elevated rates when compared to a benchmark that consid-
ered local population and reported crime rates. Id. at *20, *23-24. But this is 
again a rather one-dimensional way to view the data. Most obviously, it 
overlooks the problem of differential offending. 
If minorities commit crimes at higher rates than nonminorities, then 
even absent discrimination, one might expect them to be more frequently 
subjected to stop-and-frisk tactics. For example, if a stop is properly based 
on evidence reflecting a ��% probability that a suspect is engaged in unlaw-
ful activity, and the underlying offending rate is �.�% for nonminorities and 
5% for minorities, a nondiscriminatory stop-and-frisk regime could never-
theless produce a 12.5% nonminority stop rate and a 25% minority stop rate. 
Economists argue that elevated search rates for minorities are not troubling 
as long as minority and nonminority hit rates are comparable; elevated 
minority search rates may reflect nothing more than an efficient response to 
differential rates of offending. Cf., e.g., Jeff Dominitz & John Knowles, 
Crime Minimisation and Racial Bias: What Can We Learn from Police Search 
Data?, 116 ECON. J. F368, F368-71 (2006) (noting that racial discrimination 
can be inferred when higher search rates of a high crime–propensity group 
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yield lower hit rates than searches of a low crime–propensity group); John 
Knowles, Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: 
Theory and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203, 205 (2001) (looking at the 
success rate of police searches across races in order to determine whether 
those searches are motivated by racial prejudice). 
Just as violent victimization rates reflect a racial skew, there is ample 
reason to believe that differential offending is prevalent in New York. 
Consider the 2012 NYPD crime data regarding the race of known suspects: 
 
 Murder and Non-
Negligent Homicide 
Shootings New York City 
Population 
Black 53.7% 78.2% 22.8% 
Hispanic 34.8% 18.9% 28.8% 
White 8.7% 2.4% 33.1% 
Asian/ 
Pac. Isl. 
2.8% 0.5% 12.7% 
 
KELLY, supra, at 1, 11, B-1.  
There is also reason to believe that a strategy targeting criminal hot 
spots would increase this racial skew. Although there is no reliable data on 
the racial composition of criminal street gangs in New York, the U.S. 
Department of Justice estimates that nationally, from 1996 through 2011, 
blacks and Hispanics consistently accounted for more than 80% of total 
gang membership. Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
National Youth Gang Survey Analysis, NAT’L GANG CENTER, http:// 
www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Survey-Analysis/Demographics#anchorregm 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2013). Similarly, there is evidence that the dispropor-
tionate rates at which minorities are incarcerated for drug offenses reflect 
the fact that they are disproportionately found at open-air drug markets and 
other locations most easily targeted by police. See MICHAEL TONRY, 
MALIGN NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 
105-07 (1995); cf. R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the 
Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 583 (2003) (noting that racial disparities 
may result from targeting disproportionately minority neighborhoods where 
it is easier to apprehend drug dealers). Thus, a stop-and-frisk strategy 
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aimed at hot spots of gang and drug crime could well result in higher rates 
of minority stops, even absent discrimination.  
Judge Scheindlin made no findings as to differential offending or other 
potentially nondiscriminatory explanations for differential stop rates, except 
to acknowledge that in 2011 and 2012, 83% of all known crime suspects and 
90% of all violent crime suspects were black or Hispanic. Floyd, 2013 WL 
4046209, at *20. She also made no finding of a racial skew in hit rates, as 
measured by arrests and summonses. The plaintiffs’ expert even acknowl-
edged that arrest and summons data for ���� to ���� reflect only “small 
differences” in hit rates. Second Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan, 
Ph.D. at 34-35, Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209 (No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS)), available 
at www.ccrjustice.org/files/FaganSecondSupplementalReport.pdf. This suggests 
that police utilize equally reliable indicia of suspicion when stopping 
minorities and nonminorities. Indeed, a RAND Corporation study of 2006 
NYPD stop-and-frisk data concluded, after considering arrest rates and the 
race of criminal suspects, that there was no evidence of discrimination 
against blacks. See GREG RIDGEWAY, RAND CORP., ANALYSIS OF 
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT’S 
STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES 13-19 (2007). 
Equal protection is offended when “the decisionmaker . . . select[s] or 
reaffirm[s] a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not 
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Wayte v. 
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985) (ellipsis in original) (quoting Pers. 
Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). Accordingly, when the under-
lying rate of offending differs by race, stop-and-frisk practices could well 
involve no legally cognizable discrimination despite racially disparate stop 
rates if the disparity is a consequence of targeting enforcement where offend-
ing is greatest or most amenable to stop-and-frisk tactics. A strategy driven 
by such law enforcement considerations does not run afoul of the Fourteenth 
Amendment even if it produces racially skewed stop rates, as the Second 
Circuit suggested in an earlier case involving an investigation focusing on 
black suspects because they matched a victim’s description of the offender. 
See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 333-34 (2d Cir. 2000). 
Despite all this, Judge Scheindlin found a pattern of racial discrimina-
tion based on differences between stop rates by race and each race’s repre-
sentation in the local population. See Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *20 
(concluding that “[i]f the police are stopping people in a race-neutral way, 
then the racial composition of innocent people stopped should more or less 
mirror the racial composition of the areas where they are stopped,” since 
“nearly ��% of the people stopped are released without the officer finding 
any basis for a summons or arrest”). This was a serious error. An effective 
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stop-and-frisk strategy should not target the population at large, but rather, 
should be focused where it can do the most good, such as criminogenic hot 
spots. In light of the evidence of differential offending in New York, there 
is little reason to believe that the racial makeup of those who frequent high 
crime locations will mirror that of the population at large. Even Judge 
Scheindlin acknowledged that “[c]rime suspect data may serve as a reliable 
proxy for the pool of criminals exhibiting suspicious behavior.” Id. at *21. The 
Fourth Amendment, in turn, permits—in fact it effectively compels—a strategy 
that targets this pool, rather than the population at large. The fact that most of 
those who are stopped are released therefore does not reflect discrimination, 
but only the reality that the Fourth Amendment permits the police to act on 
the basis of evidence of criminality that stops well short of a preponderance. 
5. Although Judge Scheindlin invoked “the human toll of unconstitu-
tional stops,” id. at *2, her one-eyed appraisal neglects another human toll. 
The contours of Judge Scheindlin’s injunction have yet to take shape since 
she appointed a monitor to “develop, in consultation with the parties, an 
initial set of reforms to the NYPD’s policies, training, supervision, monitor-
ing, and discipline regarding stop and frisk.” Floyd v. City of New York, 
No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046217, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013). 
Indeed, we will likely never know the scope of the remedy that Judge 
Scheindlin had in mind since the Second Circuit has ordered her removal 
from the litigation. See In re Reassignment of Cases: Floyd v. City of New 
York, No. 13-3088, 2013 WL 5998139, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 13, 2013). Yet, the 
history of judicial efforts to overhaul policing is not encouraging. Most who 
have studied the U.S. Department of Justice’s attempts, in “pattern or 
practice” cases, see 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006), to use judicial decrees to 
reform policing have found the results disappointing. See, e.g., Rachel A. 
Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 1, 52-57 (2009); Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and 
Police Reform: Using Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accounta-
bility, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351, 371-76 (2011). If Judge Scheindlin’s remedy is 
sustained on appeal, however, and her successor judge and the appointed 
monitor put sufficient pressure on the NYPD, they probably can drive stop 
rates down. Police officers internalize few—if any—of the costs or benefits 
of search and seizure. Stop-and-frisk is a dangerous, unpleasant business. It 
should not take much to reach a tipping point. If officers face a credible 
threat of sanctions if someone complains to a monitor, they will likely stop 
bothering with stop-and-frisk. After all, there is one foolproof way to drive 
down the rate of unjustified stops—officers can stay in the doughnut shops.  
But, once it becomes apparent that a federal judge–run NYPD will no 
longer intervene forcefully and proactively on the streets, the dynamics for 
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a return to vintage crime rates will be in place. When crime spiked in 1990, 
New Yorkers at least had the option of demanding more aggressive law 
enforcement from politically accountable officials. Federal judges, however, 
enjoy life tenure, and according to Judge Scheindlin, they must resolutely 
refuse to consider the effectiveness of policing tactics. Perhaps Judge 
Scheindlin thinks of federal judges as judicial Goldilocks who can design a 
system that offers just enough—but not too much—deterrence. This is the 
stuff of which judicial hubris is made. But, given Judge Scheindlin’s an-
nounced disinterest in the efficacy of police tactics, one has little reason to 
hope that she would care if her decrees produced more crime in New York. 
Judge Scheindlin wrote, “Fostering trust and confidence between the 
police and the community would be an improvement for everyone.” Floyd, 
2013 WL 4046209, at *2. Yet the available data suggest that what drives the 
opinions of local police is the local crime rate, not race. See Rosenthal, supra, 
at 354-55. People who do not feel safe are not likely to repose their trust 
and confidence in the police. Even worse, as we have seen, the human toll 
of violent crime in New York falls disproportionately on minorities. 
Consider a New York in which wealthy white neighborhoods enjoy low 
crime rates, while, in disadvantaged minority neighborhoods, police keep 
stop rates low to please a federal judge but fail to intervene effectively to 
disrupt the dynamics that drive gang- and drug-related crime. That may 
satisfy Judge Scheindlin, who cannot be bothered with questions of police 
efficacy. To my eye, however, a New York like that fails to offer, in the 
most literal sense, equal protection of the law.  
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As John Adams famously stated in the Boston Massacre Trial, “facts are 
stubborn things.” Professor Rosenthal accuses Judge Scheindlin of ignoring 
relevant facts and viewing stop-and-frisk in a “relentlessly monocular 
fashion,” but he fails to acknowledge the substantial array of facts that 
undermine his arguments.  
Professor Rosenthal asserts that Judge Scheindlin erred in refusing to 
consider evidence of the “efficacy” of the stop-and-frisk program in New 
York City. He asks: how can a court find a policing program unreasonable if 
it “seems to work”? Of course, this position requires both proof of the 
effectiveness of stop-and-frisk practices in controlling crime and support for 
the legal proposition that conduct otherwise violative of the Constitution 
can nevertheless be considered legitimate because of its impact on crime. 
Indeed, the evidentiary bar on efficacy is high, since citizens are being asked 
to sacrifice their constitutional rights in return for guarantees of safety. 
On the factual question, Professor Rosenthal argues that because there 
was a steep decline in crime in New York City during the period in which 
stop-and-frisk became a prominent part of policing, we can assume that 
there must be some causal link. To the contrary, while there is agreement 
that New York City policing played a significant role in the crime decline, 
there is agreement as well that there are “myriad” factors at work and that it 
is extremely difficult to draw causal lines, as Professor Rosenthal concedes. 
Moreover, he conflates stop-and-frisk policing with a number of overlap-
ping police initiatives, including CompStat analysis of crime patterns, 
community policing to engage citizens, and “hot spot” policing to identify 
salient crime areas. The “proof” cited for the proposition that stop-and-frisk 
was the critical component in New York’s crime drop is surprisingly thin. 
Professor Rosenthal relies on a study by Franklin E. Zimring, but Zimring 
is careful to state that there is no specific evidence that stop-and-frisk 
played a significant role in the decline in crime. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, 
THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN 
CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 148-50 (2012). The other cited study also finds 
the evidence to be inconclusive, as a result of “the lack of adequate data on 
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possible confounding causes.” See David Weisburd, Cody W. Telep & 
Brian A. Lawton, Could Innovations in Policing Have Contributed to the New 
York City Crime Drop Even in a Period of Declining Police Strength? The Case of 
Stop, Question and Frisk as a Hot Spots Policing Strategy, JUST. Q. 16 n.11 
(Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07418825.2012.754920 
#preview. Further, Weisburd, Telep, and Lawton explicitly state that they 
cannot determine “whether the increase in [stop, question and frisk] tactics 
has come at the expense of other innovative policing strategies.” Id. at 18. 
Professor Rosenthal fails to mention other studies that find little or no 
causal relationship between stop-and-frisk and crime reduction in New York 
City. See, e.g., Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of Police 
Stops on Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003-2010, 
JUST. Q. 10 (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10. 
1080/07418825.2012.712152#.Uo4HNKHzb-s#preview. Unfortunately, the 
relationship between crime, stops, other law enforcement practices, and 
related social and economic factors is difficult, if not impossible, to measure. 
Cf. David F. Greenberg, Studying New York City’s Crime Decline: Methodologi-
cal Issues, JUST. Q. 2-3 ( Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.tandfonline.com/ 
doi/abs/10.1080/07418825.2012.752026#.Uo4IYqHzb-s#preview. Further, Profes-
sor Rosenthal does not address the large decline in crime—not as steep as in 
New York but still substantial—that was achieved in other cities without 
massive use of stop-and-frisk. See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why 
Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do 
Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 168 tbl.4, 172-73 (2004). 
Professor Rosenthal also fails to discuss contrary factual evidence from 
the New York City experience itself. Crime fell by approximately 10% in 
New York City from 1992 to 1993, two years prior to the onset of NYPD 
stop-and-frisk policing tactics, and the huge increase in stops from 2002 
through 2011 followed several years of a steep decline in New York crime. 
See Jeffrey Fagan & John MacDonald, Policing, Crime and Legitimacy in New 
York and Los Angeles: The Social and Political Contexts of Two Historic Crime 
Declines, in NEW YORK AND LOS ANGELES: THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE 
219, 240-42, 242 tbl.8.1 (David Halle & Andrew A. Beveridge eds., 2013); 
Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from 
New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV 271, 320 
app. fig.� (����).  
It is remarkable as well that the Rebuttal ignores the most pertinent 
contemporary data: during the first half of ����, there was a huge decrease 
(over 50%) in the number of stops and a continuing sharp decrease (almost 
25%) in the number of homicides, compared to the same period last year. 
RAYMOND W. KELLY, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, NEW YORK CITY 
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POLICE DEPARTMENT STOP QUESTION AND FRISK ACTIVITY 4 (2012), 
available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/����_�nd_Qtr.pdf; Joseph Goldstein, 
City Homicides Drop Sharply, Again; Police Cite New Antigang Strategy, N.Y. 
TIMES ( June 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/29/nyregion/city-
homicides-drop-sharply-again-police-cite-new-antigang-strategy.html?_r=1&; 
Joseph Goldstein, Police Stop-and-Frisk Encounters Plunged in Second Quarter 
of 2013, Data Show, N.Y. Times (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/08/28/nyregion/data-show-steep-decline-in-police-stops-in-new-york-
city-this-year.html?_r=0. And the decline in stops was even greater during 
the third quarter of 2013—the NYPD made just 21,000 stops, or 80% fewer 
than during the same time period in 2012. Associated Press, NYC Police 
Stop-and-Frisk Numbers Down Sharply, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2013), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/aponline/2013/11/18/us/ap-us-stop-and-frisk.html?ref=stop 
andfrisk&_r=1&. To be clear, I do not argue that these data prove that stop-
and-frisk plays no role in the control of violent crime, but it is powerful 
evidence that the NYPD’s claims on this issue are highly exaggerated.  
Professor Rosenthal argues that the hit rate for stops in New York “does 
not look so bad.” On this normative issue, I strongly disagree. First, the 
supposed 12% hit rate is itself an overstatement. Recent studies have shown 
that nearly 50% of all arrests and summons that result from stop-and-frisk 
activity are dismissed very early in the prosecution phase. See ERIC T. 
SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., A 
REPORT ON ARRESTS ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT’S STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES 3, 10 fig.7 (2013), available 
at http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAG_REPORT_ON_SQF_PRACTICES_ 
NOV_2013.pdf (noting that, between 2009 and 2012, 15.7% of arrests were 
not prosecuted, 10.5% were dismissed, and 21.3% were “adjourn[ed] in 
contemplation of dismissal”). Moreover, a number of these arrests and 
summonses are the result of post-stop information or police–citizen conflict 
during the course of a stop, which proves nothing about the legitimacy of 
the stop in the first place.  
Even more important is the data on frisks. New York police frisk sus-
pects they have stopped about 50% of the time (I suspect that frisks are 
underreported), yet in only 1.5% of these frisks do they uncover a weapon. 
See Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013). Considering that the Supreme Court has 
ruled that a frisk requires reasonable suspicion that the suspect is “armed 
and dangerous,” one can only wonder why the police have been wrong 
98.5% of the time. Data from other jurisdictions disclose similar very low 
hit rates for weapons. In Philadelphia, for example, the hit rate for weapons 
was �.�% during the first half of ����. See Plaintiffs’ Third Report to Court 
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and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 6-7, Bailey v. City of Philadel-
phia, C.A. No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/����/��� (noting that ��� 
frisks led to the recovery of only three guns). As I pointed out in my 
Opening Statement, either the Terry standard has become so open-ended as 
to allow frisks without cause or the police are asserting grounds for a frisk 
where none exist.  
There is also good reason to believe that the UF-250 checkbox form 
masks many improper stops. In 1999, the New York Attorney General 
reviewed instances where police were required to record narratives explain-
ing the reason for their stops. The Attorney General found that based on 
the information provided in the UF-250 forms, 15.4% of stops were not 
justified and ��.�% were ambiguous—that is, the forms did not provide 
sufficient information to allow a reader to determine whether the facts 
articulated amounted to “reasonable suspicion.” See CIVIL RIGHTS BU-
REAU, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE NEW YORK 
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP AND FRISK” PRACTICES: A 
REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 160-64 (1999), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil_rights/stp_
frsk.pdf. Similar results have been found in the Bailey litigation and in an 
academic study cited by Professor Rosenthal. See Plaintiffs’ Third Report to 
Court, supra, at 4-5; Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An 
Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s “Stop and Frisk” Policy in the 
Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813, 815-16 (2007). 
Finally, it must be remembered that the Floyd ruling on the Fourth 
Amendment claim was also based on the testimony of individuals who had 
been subjected to illegal stops. Professor Rosenthal asserts that such 
testimony was “cherry-picked,” but corroborating evidence demonstrates 
that the reality of stop-and-frisk in New York City includes a pattern of 
officer conduct that is needlessly humiliating and intimidating. See, e.g., 
Wendy Ruderman, For Women in Street Stops, Deeper Humiliation, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/07/nyregion/for-
women-in-street-stops-deeper-humiliation.html.  
As a legal matter, Professor Rosenthal assures us that nothing permits 
“unconstrained” stops, but he provides no standards by which to distinguish 
between proper stops and those that are prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment. The argument that efficacy trumps standard Fourth Amendment 
restraints runs counter to over 200 years of constitutional history. We 
should not forget the role that the “writs of assistance” played in the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment. These writs were used by the British 
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Government to detect and suppress widespread violations by the colonists 
of laws mandating import duties and taxes. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the writs were effective, those who drafted the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures intended to prohibit this 
type of random search. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-27 
(����). The fact that crime can be more effectively suppressed if the police 
are freed of all restraints on their power to search is quite beside the 
constitutional point. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment was adopted to ensure 
that the “liberty of every man [is not placed] in the hands of every petty 
officer.” Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1965) (quoting Boyd, 116 
U.S. at 625). In other cases in which the challenged police practices were 
similarly effective, the Supreme Court has rejected the “efficacy” argument 
where the searches were not justified under the Fourth Amendment. See, 
e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34-35, 47-48 (2000) 
(holding a highway drug checkpoint program unconstitutional despite a 
4.74% drug-related arrest rate and an 8.96% overall arrest rate). 
Professor Rosenthal’s Fourteenth Amendment analysis is equally ques-
tionable. Citing the high rates of both victimization and offending by 
African Americans with respect to violent crimes, he asserts that a program 
that reduces the level of crime must be legitimate even if it disproportion-
ately affects African Americans. There are a number of flaws in this ap-
proach. First, it is simply not permissible to target all members of a racial 
minority for the acts of very few of that group. Judge Scheindlin was careful 
to acknowledge that an officer can legitimately consider race when stopping 
a person who fits a specific suspect description (a category that constituted 
the basis for a mere 13% of the stops in New York City), Floyd, 2013 WL 
4046209, at *20, but that is a far cry from the City’s argument that group 
actuarial-based suspicion is permissible. To the contrary, stopping individu-
als based on their race because other members of that race are responsible 
for higher rates of crime is precisely the kind of discrimination barred by 
the Equal Protection Clause. See Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, 
Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2002) (“The 
essence of racial profiling is a global judgment that the targeted group . . . is 
more prone to commit crime . . . .”). Further, the Second Circuit has 
specifically warned that “a description of race and gender alone will rarely 
provide reasonable suspicion justifying a police search or seizure.” Brown v. 
City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2000). 
Second, Judge Scheindlin credited benchmarks that considered local 
offending patterns. See Floyd, ���� WL �������, at *�. Plaintiffs’ expert 
considered the total volume of crimes in small, racially homogeneous areas 
and employed regression analysis to determine if factors other than race 
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could explain the large racial disparities in New York City stops. See Second 
Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 2-5, Floyd, 2013 WL 
4046209 (No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS)), available at www.ccrjustice.org/ 
files/FaganSecondSupplementalReport.pdf. Professor Rosenthal complains 
that these benchmarks do not take into consideration “differential offend-
ing” patterns by race and asserts that since the stop rates approximate the 
reports of suspect race data for serious crimes in New York City, the 
program is free of racial bias.  
There are several problems with this argument. There is far from com-
plete data as to the race of those involved in “reported” crimes; the great 
majority of stops (85%) between 2004 and 2009 were not based on suspicion 
of violent crime, Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *46 n.424; and only 13% of 
stops were based on a determination that the suspect fit a specific physical 
description. Id. at *20. Thus, the notion that stop-and-frisk practices are 
carefully calibrated to respond to violent crime (or even crimes of posses-
sion of weapons) is refuted by the factual record.  
Along the same lines, Professor Rosenthal cites studies by economists 
who suggest that racially disparate stop rates of motorists are justified if 
they eventually lead to an “equilibrium” in offending rates (on the high-
ways, this usually means drug offenses). See, e.g., John Knowles, Nicola 
Persico & Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and 
Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203 (2001). Putting aside substantial criticisms 
of these studies’ methodologies, see e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, 
AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN 
AN ACTUARIAL AGE 122-39 (2007); Steven N. Durlauf, Assessing Racial 
Profiling, 116 ECON. J. F402, F406-07 (2006), and the fact that highway 
stops involve a universe of drivers, almost all of whom are legitimate 
“suspects” due to traffic infractions, it is impermissible to treat individuals 
of one racial group differently on the basis of higher offending levels of that 
group. Would the advocates of this approach to crime control argue that if 
one racial group is responsible for twice as many violent crimes as another, 
the state could enact sentencing laws that double that group’s sentences, on 
the theory that the increased deterrence will eventually lead to an equilibri-
um in offending? 
Third, Professor Rosenthal’s defense of highly disproportionate rates of 
prosecution and incarceration of whites and African Americans for drug 
offenses is highly problematic. The national data demonstrate that whites 
use, possess, and sell drugs at rates approximately equal to minorities, but 
the arrest and incarceration rates for drug offenses are overwhelmingly 
disparate by race. See MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: PREPARED 
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FOR THE HOUSE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERROR-
ISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY 3-4 (2009), available at http://judiciary. 
house.gov/hearings/pdf/mauer091029.pdf (testifying that in 2005, African 
Americans represented 14% of current drug users, 33.9% of persons arrested 
for a drug offense, and ��% of persons sentenced to prison for a drug 
offense); Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Effects of Drug 
and Crime Control Policies on Black Americans, in 37 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A 
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 23-��, �� fig.�, �� tbl.� (Michael Tonry ed., 
2008). And in New York City, the racial disparities in marijuana arrests are 
truly astounding. See Harry Levine, The Scandal of Racist Marijuana Ar-
rests—and What to Do About It, NATION (Oct. 30, 2013), http:// 
www.thenation.com/article/176915/scandal-racist-marijuana-arrests-and-what- 
do-about-it#. African Americans are at great risk in the war on drugs; 
whites, whether on college campuses, or in middle-class communities—and 
particularly with respect to marijuana—get a free ride. Is this racial discrim-
ination? Not according to Professor Rosenthal who views this merely as an 
artifact of policing “easy targets.” 
Having failed to come to grips with the facts and the law on both the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment issues, Professor Rosenthal ends with 
the usual dire warning: that the Floyd remedial order will lead to “de-
policing.” Fortunately, there is no support for the argument that police will 
retreat to the nearest doughnut shop for fear of complaints or lawsuits, or to 
avoid what they view as unfair limits on their power. As noted above, 
before Judge Scheindlin’s ruling, the NYPD substantially decreased its 
number of stops, yet crime rates continued to fall. Rather than de-policing, 
the NYPD altered its practices in the summer of 2013, shifting from casting 
a broad net of low-yield, unproductive stops to a tactical focus on youth 
gangs and crimes in and around public housing projects. See Joseph Goldstein 
& J. David Goodman, Frisking Tactic Yields to a Focus on Youth Gangs, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/nyregion/ 
frisking-tactic-yields-to-a-focus-on-youth-gangs.html?_r=0.  
In other jurisdictions where courts have intervened, there is no evidence 
of such “de-policing.” See CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL., POLICING LOS 
ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE 
AT THE LAPD 22 (2009), available at http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/ 
pdf/Harvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf. The experience in Los Angeles shows 
that a consent decree and new community policing models can lead to 
better police practices, higher levels of community cooperation with the 
police, and lower rates of crime.  
A final point. Defenders of New York’s stop-and-frisk practices assert 
that the decrease in crime has largely benefitted the African American 
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community, which suffers most of the violent crime and, therefore, whatever 
the indignities suffered, overall the practices provide a distinct advantage to 
African Americans. Indeed, some suggest that those who do not live in high 
crime areas should refrain from criticizing any policing methods that drive 
down crime in those neighborhoods. But it appears quite clear—from the 
recent mayoral election and from widespread criticism of current policing in 
New York City—that many African Americans believe the past practices to 
be unnecessarily harsh, humiliating, and oppressive.  
The Floyd decisions on liability and remedial measures were proper and 
necessary. Court intervention that is properly calibrated to deal with proven 
constitutional violations can both remediate the violations and leave police 
with the powers necessary for effective crime control. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
What, Me Worry? 
LAWRENCE ROSENTHAL 
Professor Rudovsky assures us that a hostile judicial takeover of the 
NYPD is no cause for concern—it will eliminate the supposed evils of stop-
and-frisk without unintended consequences. For those of us who can afford 
to live in safe, stable communities where crime rates remain relatively 
constant regardless of the policing tactics used, this kind of talk is cheap. 
For the less fortunate among us, there is more cause for concern.  
1. Professor Rudovsky doubts any relationship between stop-and-frisk 
and crime reduction. His argument, however, encounters a few inconven-
ient facts, even as he warns us that “‘facts are stubborn things.’”  
Professor Rudovsky tells us that crime began declining in New York 
from 1992 to 1993, before the advent of stop-and-frisk, but he overlooks the 
fact that, according to the Attorney General’s report that he himself cites, 
the NYPD began focusing on aggressive patrol and combating low-level 
disorder as early as 1990, under Police Commissioner Lee Brown. See CIVIL 
RIGHTS BUREAU, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE 
NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP AND FRISK” PRAC-
TICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 47-52 (1999), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil_rights/stp_frsk
.pdf. In fact, an article coauthored by the plaintiffs’ expert in Floyd v. City of 
New York acknowledged that the crime decline in New York bore a close 
temporal relationship to the adoption of more aggressive policing tactics. 
See Jeffrey Fagan, Franklin E. Zimring & June Kim, Declining Homicide in 
New York City: A Tale of Two Trends, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1277, 1313-16 (1998). The same expert also coauthored a study demonstrating 
the efficacy of aggressive patrols undertaken near public housing projects. 
See Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies & Jan Holland, The Paradox of the Drug 
Elimination Program in New York City Public Housing, 13 GEO. J. ON POV-
ERTY L. & POL’Y 415, 442-53 (2006). Even more recently, he coauthored 
an essay, cited by Professor Rudovsky on another point, that concluded that 
the NYPD’s COMPSTAT program—which uses statistical analysis “to 
drive the allocation of police resources to crime ‘hot spots’”—was clearly 
linked to crime reduction: “If we were to focus on only examining the effect 
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of the COMPSTAT program in New York City that started in 1994, we 
would see a clear influence of this program in reducing robberies and 
homicides.” Jeffrey Fagan & John MacDonald, Policing, Crime and Legitimacy 
in New York and Los Angeles: The Social and Political Contexts of Two Historic 
Crime Declines, in NEW YORK AND LOS ANGELES: THE UNCERTAIN 
FUTURE 219, 240 (David Halle & Andrew A. Beveridge eds., 2013).  
Professor Rudovsky does not quarrel with the efficacy of COMPSTAT 
or “hot spot” policing, yet he seems to believe that one can disaggregate the 
effects of these policing strategies from those of stop-and-frisk. They are, 
however, inextricably intertwined. Studying statistical data alone does not 
drive down crime, nor does telling officers to visit hot spots. Without stop-
and-frisk, these other tactics cannot alter the calculus of potential offenders 
on the streetscape. Indeed, as I note in my Rebuttal, a wide variety of 
studies throughout the nation have demonstrated the efficacy of aggressive 
patrol targeted at hot spots. And, if stop-and-frisk succeeds in driving down 
crime, it gets harder to brand it constitutionally unreasonable. To be sure, 
Professor Rudovsky is correct that evidence of the efficacy of a policing 
tactic cannot “trump[] standard Fourth Amendment restraints,” but it is 
equally settled that the Fourth Amendment requires consideration of both 
the privacy and law-enforcement interests at stake in order to assess that 
tactic’s reasonableness in the constitutional sense. To ignore efficacy is to 
ignore at least half of the calculus. Thus, to claim that “citizens are being 
asked to sacrifice their constitutional rights in return for guarantees of 
safety” is to assume an unwarranted conclusion about the constitutionality 
of a practice that may well be predicated on reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, as demonstrated by its ability to drive down crime. 
Professor Rudovsky argues that cities other than New York also experi-
enced crime declines, but he pays little attention to Franklin Zimring’s 
exhaustive demonstration that no major city experienced a crime decline as 
steep and long lasting as that of New York. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, 
THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN 
CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 3-27 (2012). He also cites a study showing 
little correlation between stop-and-frisk and crime decline in New York 
from 2003 to 2010, see Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of 
Police Stops on Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003-
2010, JUST. Q. 10 (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/ 
10.1080/07418825.2012.712152#.Uo4HNKHzb-s#preview, but ignores the 
point made in my Rebuttal—in the last decade, it may well be that stop-and-frisk 
passed the point of diminishing returns, which would explain the lack of 
correlation between stop-and-frisk and crime decline during that period. 
Indeed, the authors of the study that Professor Rudovsky cites acknowledge 
4-Part Debate Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  12/10/2013 9:30 AM 
2013]    The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in New York City 147 
both that their conclusion is “[i]n contrast with prior research,” and that the 
total rate of documented stops tripled between 2003 and 2010. See id. at 2-3. 
Having observed the success of stop-and-frisk, the NYPD may have 
expanded its use beyond the criminogenic hot spots where it is most likely 
to pay dividends. Overuse of stop-and-frisk during the past decade likely 
explains as well the NYPD’s ability to keep crime rates low over the past 
eighteen months even as it has reduced its reliance on stop-and-frisk. An 
unnecessary increase in stop rates since 2003, however, supplies an argu-
ment for returning stop-and-frisk to its original focus on hot spots—not for 
the complete overhaul ordered by Judge Scheindlin, with stated indifference 
to questions of efficacy. 
When it comes to the efficacy of stop-and-frisk, it is striking that Pro-
fessor Rudovsky offers no alternate explanation for New York’s crime 
decline. As I note in my Rebuttal, no other explanation presents itself. It is 
true, as Professor Rudovsky notes, that “the relationship between crime, 
stops, other law enforcement practices, and related social and economic 
factors is difficult, if not impossible, to measure.” But, if there is even a 
serious case to be made for the efficacy of stop-and-frisk, surely we should 
hesitate before abandoning a tactic that may well save lives, mostly those from 
impoverished and disproportionately minority communities. Abandoning a 
tactic that may well work, after all, amounts to a gamble with people’s lives. 
2. Like Judge Scheindlin, Professor Rudovsky speculates that the 12% hit 
rate reflected in the New York stop-and-frisk data may be overstated. Yet, 
the evidence he offers makes a thin gruel. That many charges arising from 
stops and frisks are dismissed at some point prior to trial, for example, is 
not evidence that these charges were unsupported by probable cause; the 
standard for conviction, of course, is higher than the standard required to 
justify a stop or an ensuing arrest. Beyond that, prosecutors may abandon a 
case for a myriad of reasons unrelated to the propriety of the arrest or stop 
that may have preceded it. Professor Rudovsky also disregards the rather 
low rate (�%) of unjustified stops calculated by the plaintiffs’ expert, see 
Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209, at 
*16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013), and instead cites the higher rates calculated by 
the New York Attorney General in 1999 based on the UF-250 forms then in 
use. See CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, supra, at 160-64. That iteration of the 
form, however, was intended solely as an investigative tool; it was neither 
intended nor used to document the justification for stops. See James J. Fyfe, 
Reaction Essay, Stops, Frisks, Searches, and the Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 379, 392-94 (2004). The 1999 Attorney General’s report, in 
short, proves little. And, as I note in my Rebuttal, even the current form 
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has dramatic limitations as a tool for identifying unjustified stops. About 
this, Professor Rudovsky is silent. 
Professor Rudovsky highlights Judge Scheindlin’s finding that only 
about 1.5% of frisks recover weapons, though this amounts to a recovery of 
some 33,882 weapons. See Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *13 & n.110. One 
wonders exactly how high the probability that a suspect is armed and 
dangerous needs to be before Professor Rudovsky would permit a frisk. It is 
hard to brand an officer unreasonable if, when stopping a suspect reasonably 
suspected of criminal activity while in a statistical hot spot of violent crime, 
that officer does not require much in the way of additional predication 
before performing a protective frisk. After all, the officer’s life is at risk. For 
just this reason, if judicial intervention places too much pressure on officers 
to refrain from frisks, especially in hot spots of violent crime, the likely 
result is that officers will simply abstain from stopping suspects altogether. 
As Chief Justice Warren cautioned, excessive judicial efforts to restrict 
officers’ ability to protect themselves “may exact a high toll in human injury 
and frustration of efforts to prevent crime.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 
(1968). If we are to take seriously the notion that the Fourth Amendment’s 
command of reasonableness requires that we balance privacy and law-
enforcement interests, surely we should regard an officer’s ability to err on 
the side of caution when safety is at risk as an interest of the highest order. 
3. Professor Rudovsky and I can agree that “stopping individuals based 
on their race because other members of that race are responsible for higher 
rates of crime is precisely the kind of discrimination barred by the Equal 
Protection Clause.” But, the small differences in hit rates in New York for 
stops and frisks of members of different racial groups suggest that persons 
are not being stopped because of their race, but based on equally valid 
indicia of reasonable suspicion. Beyond that, Professor Rudovsky never 
explains why, in light of the ample evidence of differential offending by race 
in New York—evidence with which neither the plaintiffs nor Judge 
Scheindlin quarreled—we should expect stop rates to be representative of 
the racial composition of the population at large, rather than that of the 
pool of offenders.  
Especially for a stop-and-frisk strategy focused at hot spots of violent 
crime, we should expect stop rates to reflect the racial composition of the 
subset of those likely to frequent such hot spots, not that of the general 
population. Similarly, even if whites and blacks use drugs at roughly equal 
rates, a stop-and-frisk strategy focusing on the kind of street-level distribu-
tion most vulnerable to that tactic should be expected to reflect the racial 
composition of the pool of street-level traffickers, not the population of 
drug users at large. If we focus on the subset of the population most likely 
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to frequent the statistical hot spots of violent crime on which stop-and-frisk 
focuses, then the racial composition of the pool of offenders in New York 
would seem to be a far better proxy than the general population. Judge 
Scheindlin even acknowledged that “[c]rime suspect data may serve as a 
reliable proxy for the pool of criminals exhibiting suspicious behavior.” 
Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *21. This is precisely why crime suspect data 
offers a far better proxy for those most likely to be subjected to stop-and-
frisk based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in a nondiscrimina-
tory regime than a benchmark based on the racial composition of the 
population at large. Cf. United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 862-64 (2002) 
(per curiam) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a capital prosecu-
tion based on statistics showing that the United States charges blacks with 
death-eligible offenses at higher rates than whites and enters into plea 
bargains more frequently with whites “because respondent failed to submit 
relevant evidence that similarly situated persons were treated differently”). 
Officers on patrol are looking for offenders, not the innocent.  
It seems that Judge Scheindlin and Professor Rudovsky are distressed 
that the NYPD is not stopping enough innocent whites. Yet, if the NYPD 
stopped more innocent whites, the hit rate for stops of whites would fall 
below that for minority stops, providing potential white plaintiffs powerful 
support for their own equal protection claim that the NYPD discriminated 
against them on the basis of race. Thus, given the population benchmark 
employed by Judge Scheindlin and endorsed by Professor Rudovsky, the 
NYPD would violate the Equal Protection Clause no matter what it did. 
These are the inescapable conundrums born of a failure to take account of the 
undisputed evidence of differential rates of offending by race in New York City.  
4. Professor Rudovsky dismisses fears that placing judicial pressure on 
stop-and-frisk will overdeter police. Yet, as even critics of urban policing 
acknowledge, there is substantial evidence that police respond to criticism 
of perceived racial profiling in just this fashion. See, e.g., Frank Rudy 
Cooper, Understanding “Depolicing”: Symbiosis Theory and Critical Culture 
Theory, 71 UMKC L. REV. 355, 357-64 (2002). Economists have modeled and 
studied the phenomenon, and caution that proper training and supervision of 
officers are critical to ensuring that police reforms aimed at reducing 
perceived misconduct do not produce higher rates of unlawful behavior. See, 
e.g., Paul Heaton, Understanding the Effects of Antiprofiling Policies, 53 J.L. & 
ECON. 29, 57-58 (2010). 
Under other circumstances, the risk of overdeterrence might be regarded 
as acceptable since politically accountable officials have potent incentives to 
ensure that police fight crime effectively. Now that crime in New York is 
low, the focus seems to have turned to police reform, but if crime were to 
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rise, the ordinary processes of political accountability would cause the 
pendulum to swing. But, when an unaccountable, life-tenured federal judge 
seizes control of a police department, declares her disinterest in the efficacy 
of police tactics, and then appoints a monitor with a mission to reduce the 
prevalence of stop-and-frisk, one has to worry how the police will react, and 
whether the ordinary political checks and balances will remain effective if 
crime begins to spiral. At least, I worry. Professor Rudovsky, not so much. 
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